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Abstract—Blockchains and smart contracts are an emerging,
promising technology, that has received considerable attention.
We use the blockchain technology, and in particular Ethereum,
to implement a large-scale event-based Internet of Things (IoT)
control system. We argue that the distributed nature of the
“ledger,” as well as, Ethereum’s capability of parallel execution
of replicated “smart contracts”, provide the sought after automa-
tion, generality, flexibility, resilience, and high availability. We de-
sign a realistic blockchain-based IoT architecture, using existing
technologies while by taking into consideration the characteristics
and limitations of IoT devices and applications. Furthermore, we
leverage blockchain’s immutability and Ethereum’s support for
custom tokens to build a robust and efficient token-based access
control mechanism. Our evaluation shows that our solution is
viable and offers significant security and usability advantages.
Index Terms—Access control, System and Network Manage-
ment, Publish-Subscribe, Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT),
security tokens, Internet of Things, Web of Things, gateways
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain technology is expected to revolutionize and
“democratize” the Internet of Things (IoT) [1], facilitating
alternative communication paradigms and enabling novel se-
curity mechanisms [2]. The solutions presented in this paper
are a step towards this direction: we take advantage of the
distributed nature of blockchains to build a large scale IoT
control system, and we leverage smart contract based tokens
to implement a novel access control mechanism. We argue
that existing approaches lack realism and do not take full
advantage of the possibilities and capabilities of the blockchain
technology. Indeed, related work in this area either neglects the
limitations of the IoT devices, or tries to introduce new, hard
to deploy, blockchain technologies, or proposes(unrealistic)
modifications to existing blockchain architectures. Similarly, it
does not create new solutions using the new features provided
by this novel paradigm, instead it tries to merely transfer
existing techniques into the new environment. Although, the
latter approach may seem to have some value, it turns out
that many of the existing solutions do not consider the partic-
ularities of the blockchain technology. For example, (public)
blockchains cannot be used for storing secret and sensitive
information, nevertheless, many proposals use blockchains for
storing private user data and business roles and structures.
The work in this paper is concerned with the secure opera-
tion of (large) IoT deployments and is based on the observation
that many blockchain solutions can be used as event-based
systems. With this in mind we design a blockchain-based
architecture that allows users to control IoT devices organized
in “groups” (e.g., turn on the lights of a smart city). Our
architecture, which is built using the Ethereum blockchain [3],
considers the limitations and capabilities of the IoT devices, as
well as the properties of the blockchain technology. Then, we
secure this architecture by adding a token-based access control
solution, using Ethereum’s custom tokens. This approach has
some significant advantages compared to existing token-based
approaches, with the most important being that it is impossible
for a user to transfer his security tokens to another user. The
contributions of this paper are the following.
• We design a blockchain-based IoT architecture based on
existing technologies and we define its actors and their
interactions
• We design, implement, and evaluate an event-driven IoT
management solution based on Ethereum’s smart con-
tracts
• We leverage Ethereum’s support for custom tokens to
implement a token-based access control mechanism for
our management system
• We design various extensions to our access control mech-
anism that achieve common security tasks
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In
Section II we present some background information of the
technologies used in our paper, as well as related work. In
Section III we introduce our blockchain-based IoT architecture
and in Section IV we present a token-based access control
system for this architecture. We evaluate our solution in
Section V and we conclude our paper in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Blockchain systems are distributed-ledger architectures
where a set of mutually untrusted nodes can agree on a com-
mon view of an indelible, tamper-proof, append-only ledger.
In its basic form, a ledger includes a list of transactions among
users. Users can send new transactions to the blockchain
network and, if these transactions are valid, they are eventually
appended to the ledger by a randomly selected specialized
node referred to as the miner. Advanced forms of ledgers
may also include programs known as smart contracts. Smart
contracts are associated with some “state” also stored in
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the ledger. Users can interact with a smart contract using
transactions and they may modify the contract state.
A popular blockchain architecture that supports smart con-
tracts is Ethereum [3]. From a high level perspective Ethereum
smart contracts can be regarded as programming classes and
users can interact with the public functions of those classes
using transactions. Smart contracts are stored in the ledger
and they are identified by an address. Moreover, once they
are deployed their code cannot be modified. Contracts are
implemented in a low level Turing-complete language and they
are executed in a “virtual machine” known as the Ethereum
Virtual Machine. Smart contracts can receive input only from
the ledger, other smart contracts, and the user who invoked
them, i.e., smart contracts do not have access to information
and resources outside the Ethereum blockchain. Some modifi-
cations to a smart contract state can be marked as “events” and
end-user applications and libraries that monitor the Ethereum
blockchain can “raise alerts” whenever a specific type of event
occurs.
Ethereum users own (at least) one public-private key pair.
The private key, which is usually protected in a “wallet,” is
used for signing transactions. A user may own an Ethereum
“full node” and interact directly with the blockchain, or he may
relay his transactions through another full node that also acts
as a “remote procedure call (RPC)” server. Each design choice
has its trade-offs: maintaining a full node requires continuous
network connectivity and some non-negligible storage space
for storing the Ethereum blockchain,1 whereas relaying trans-
actions through an RPC server entails the risk that the RPC
server is offline or it acts maliciously and drops messages.2
Early attempts to incorporate blockchain technology into the
IoT proposed new blockchain systems. For example, Dorri
et al. [4] designed a blockchain-based smart home manage-
ment system. They proposed a custom, blockchain technology,
where the home gateways hold the role of the miners. Such
solutions are hard to be deployed since they require a “critical
mass.” Our approach is built on existing technologies and can
be used with already available libraries and wallets.
More recent attempts are using blockchain technology and
smart contracts to provide security and access control for
the IoT. Hammi et al. [5] propose a blockchain-based IoT
communication system. They use an Ethereum smart contact
to group IoT devices in “bubbles” of trust. Each bubble is
managed by a “master” which decides which device can
join the bubble. In order for a device to join a bubble it
must present to the smart contract a “lightweight certificate”
signed by the bubble master. After joining a bubble a de-
vice can communicate with the rest of the bubble members.
The communication can take place only through the smart
contract, which checks if the sending and receiving devices
belong to the same bubble. Novo [6] proposes a blockchain-
based architecture for managing access to IoT devices. The
1The size of the Ethereum blockchain on 28 Feb. 2019 was reported by
https://etherscan.io to be 132GB
2An RPC server cannot act on a user’s behalf, neither can it replay
messages.
proposed solution is based on an Ethereum smart contract
where “managers” can define the IoT resources that another
device can access. Gateway nodes, called “management hubs”,
are responsible for handling resource requests by taking into
consideration the policies stored in the blockchain. Zhang et
al. [7] propose a smart contract based access control system
for the IoT. In their construction the actions a “subject”
can perform on an “object,” as well as the corresponding
permissions are recorded in an “access control contract”. A
“register contract” is responsible for maintaining a mapping
from subject-object identifier pairs to access control contract
addresses. An IoT gateway handles resource requests and is
responsible for enforcing the access control policies defined
in the corresponding access control smart contract. Those
solutions follow a similar pattern: they encode in a smart
contract the actions a specific user can perform to a particular
IoT device/resource. Our solution extends these approaches by
considering the token balance of users in the access control
policies. In other words, those solutions resemble to an access
system which is based on usernames and passwords, whereas
our solution resembles a role-based access control system.
Furthermore, by leveraging the token handling functionalities
of the Ethereum platform our approach enables some novel
constructions.
Recently, Hanada et al. [8] explored the potential of smart
contracts for machine-to-machine (M2M) communication. To
this end, they developed and evaluated an IoT application
for automated, M2M, gasoline purchases that uses Ethereum
smart contracts to perform transactions. Our work is also
in this direction. Nevertheless, in addition to merely using
smart contracts to provide message transfer and payments, our
solution supports group communication and access control.
III. A BLOCKCHAIN-BASED IOT ARCHITECTURE
We now describe our Ethereum-based IoT architecture (as
the typical smart-contract enabled blockchain architecture).
Our architecture is composed of the following entities:
• The blockchain infrastructure
• A smart contract that generates events
• Full nodes that also act as RPC servers
• IoT devices
• IoT gateways
• Clients that want to control the IoT devices
Clients and IoT gateways are in control of an Ethereum
blockchain wallet. A client does not have to interact directly
with an IoT gateway (or IoT device), instead all interactions
take place through the blockchain. From a high-level per-
spective our architecture is designed as follows. All device
operations are mapped to a function in a smart contract; every
time a client invokes a function (properly) the smart contract
generates the corresponding blockchain events. These events
are received by interested IoT gateways and eventually result
in an operation in the appropriate IoT devices.
Clients and IoT gateways can be Ethereum full nodes
themselves or they can be connected to the blockchain through
another full node acting as an RPC server. In the following
0xa3c1
RPC Server RPC Server
Client IoT GW IoT GW
IoT Devices
(3) 0xa3c1/Operation
(4) 0xa3c1/Operation
(2) invokeOperation
(URI, TurnOnLights)
(1) watch 0xa3c1/Operation
{OPCode:TurnOnLights,
URI:building6/floor2}
(3) 0xa3c1/Operation
(5) URI, Operation
Fig. 1. Our blockchain-based IoT architecture.
we consider the latter design option. IoT devices on the other
hand are connected to IoT gateways. In this section we do not
consider any particular governance model; any IoT gateway
may “watch” for (and act upon) events and any Ethereum
user can act as the system client. In the following section we
describe an access control mechanism where only authorized
users can act as a client.
As IoT devices we consider actuators and we assume that an
actuation process can be invoked through an “operation”, e.g.,
“turn on the light”.3 Furthermore, IoT devices are identified
by URIs. Following the semantics of CoAP group communi-
cation [9] we consider that an IoT device may have multiple
URIs and a URI may correspond to multiple devices. The
semantics of a URI are application specific, for instance
they may indicate the physical location of a device, e.g.,
“buidling6/floor3/room2”. An IoT gateway knows the URIs
and the supported operations of the devices attached to it (e.g.,
by using an out-of-band configuration mechanism, or by using
a service discovery protocol–such as [10]).
The main component of our system is a smart contract
whose address is considered well-known. When invoked, this
smart contract generates the appropriate events. An Ethereum
event has a name and some attributes. An RPC client may
request to watch the events produced by a smart contract
by specifying the event name and optionally a filter over (a
maximum of three) “indexable” attributes. In our architecture
we consider a generic event name (i.e., Operation) and we
specify for each event two attributes: an indexable called
OPCode that encodes the desired operation and a second
one, also indexable, called URIResource that corresponds to
the URI of the device(s) in which OPCode is applied.4 IoT
gateways register to their RPC server to watch the event
Operation of our smart contract and (optionally) specify filters
on the event’s attributes.
Clients simply interact with the smart contract and invoke
the appropriate functions. The main function of our smart
3 Of course, sensors can easily be handled and their operations can be
thought of as “provide me your current data. ”
4In order to be more precise, since Ethereum does not allow strings to be
indexable, the attribute URIResource holds the hash of the URI.
contract is called invokeOperation. This function accepts two
input parameters: an OPCode and a URIResource, and gen-
erates an Operation event whose attributes have the same
value as the function call parameters. Eventually, this event
reaches the IoT gateways that are “watching” for it. In return,
each IoT gateway invokes the corresponding operation at the
IoT devices that are associated with the specified URI. An
overview of our approach is illustrated in Figure 1. In this
figure, there is a client, two IoT gateways, and two IoT
devices attached to each gateway. One of the gateways starts
watching for the Operation event of the smart contract located
at the address “0xa3c1” (step 1). Furthermore, the gateway
requests events to be filtered based on their OPCode and
specifies that it wants to watch only for events in which
OPCode is “TurnOnLights”. At some point a client invokes
the invokeOperation function of the smart contract. It uses
as URIResource a URI that matches the IoT devices of the
aforementioned gateway and as OPCode “TurnOnLights” (step
2). This transaction results in the creation of an event, which
is propagated to all full nodes (step 3). Furthermore, it is
transmitted to the IoT gateways that are watching for such
events, including our example gateway (step 4). The gateway
extracts the URIResource of the event and checks if it matches
any of the IoT devices attached to it. Since this is the case
in our example, the IoT gateway executes the corresponding
operation on the appropriate devices (step 5).
IV. TOKEN-BASED ACCESS CONTROL USING SMART
CONTRACTS
Many legacy access control mechanisms implement access
control using “tokens” that indicate the capabilities of a
client over a resource. However, token management, security,
and semantics interpretation cannot be trivially implemented,
especially in the context of the IoT. For this reason, in this
section we leverage the capability of the Ethereum blockchain
to support custom tokens and we implement an access control
mechanism.
Ethereum has specified a “token standard” called
ERC20 [11]. This standard defines some functions that
a smart contract should implement in order to be treated as
a token (i.e., a new type of coin). Many popular Ethereum
wallets can handle ERC20-based tokens. The core of our
access control mechanism is built using two of these
functions, namely balanceOf and transfer. The first function
returns the token balance of a user. The second function can
be invoked by a user A in order to transfer some tokens (he
owns) to another user B.
The smart contract of the architecture defined in the previ-
ous section is extended with implementations of the functions
defined by the ERC20 standard. These extensions can be used
for providing access control as follows. Initially a user that
owns the smart contract assigns all tokens to himself. We
refer to this user as the “owner”. The owner then transfers
at least one token to each authorized client. As a matter
of fact, the number of tokens a client owns can be used
as an indication of his role: the more tokens he owns the
more privileged his role. The contract owner can protect an
operation by specifying the roles (i.e., the balance in custom
tokens) of the authorized clients. Therefore, in the simplest
case, an operation can be protected simply by having the
smart contract function checking if the client that invokes it
owns the necessary number of tokens (this check is trivially
implemented using the balanceOf function). We now discuss
some more advanced applications of our approach.
A. Token transfer
In theory, and based on the ERC20 semantics, any client
can transfer some of his tokens to another client using the
transfer function. Of course, this constitutes a security threat
since this way a client authorizes another client–potentially
malicious–to perform an operation. It should be noted here that
this is an existing threat in legacy token-based access control
systems. Fortunately, ERC20 defines only an “interface” and
does not dictate any particular implementation choice. Hence,
in our contract, a client is allowed to transfer his tokens only
to the owner. This transfer is enabled in order to support
functionalities such as “shifts” where a client is authorized
to perform an operation only for a specific time period (that
corresponds to his shift) and then transfers through the owner
his authorization to the client of the next shift. It should be
noted here that off-chain token transfers are impossible.
B. Clients in probation period
Another interesting capability of an ERC20 compatible
smart contract is that it can modify the token balance of a user
at will. In our mechanism we leverage this feature to support
clients in probation, trainees, and similar roles. In particular,
we allow the owner to define a list of clients whose balance
is decreased by one every time they invoke an operation. This
way these clients are allowed to perform only a certain number
of operations, then the results of these operations are inspected
(out of band), and if everything is as expected, the clients
regain their tokens back.
C. Supervised operations
Using our mechanism, it is possible to define “critical”
functions, that require the “approval” of a client that holds
a more privileged role. In particular, if such a function is
invoked by an underprivileged client, instead of producing
an Operation event, a new type of event is produced called
AuthorizationRequest. This event is handled by a privileged
client, who inspects its fields and acts accordingly, i.e., he
may ignore it, or he may invoke the same function again so
that the Operation event is generated.
D. Two-steps access control
Since the Ethereum ledger is distributed (which is a key
property of blockchain-based systems) any full node (or RPC
client) can learn the token balance of a user without interacting
with the corresponding smart contract. This property enables
the definition of additional (possibly finer grained) access
control policies at the IoT gateways. This means that even
if a client is authorized by the smart contract, eventually
his operation may be rejected by some/all IoT gateways.
The access control policies defined at the IoT gateways may
take into consideration, in addition to the role of the client,
other auxiliary information provided by the “real” world,
such as time, location information, other IoT measurements,
etc. Notice that smart contracts do not have access to such
information.
E. Panic button
Our access control smart contract defines a function that
can be invoked only by the owner and it resets the token
balances of all users, returning in essence all tokens back to
the owner. This function can be used in case of emergency,
e.g., in case of a security breach. Additionally, when invoking
this function, the owner can specify the public key of a user,
resetting this way the balance of that particular user. Using
this approach client revocation can be trivially implemented.
Since all transactions are recorded in the blockchain, it is
painless to restore user balances to their value prior the ”panic
button” invocation. Moreover, the clients whose tokens are
revoked have no control over this process, hence revocation is
instantaneous and effective.
V. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
A. Performance and cost evaluation
We have implemented and tested our proposed solution
in a private Ethereum network, as well as in the Rinkeby
and Ropsten Ethereum testnets. As an IoT gateway we have
used Mozilla’s Thing Gateway5 that implements the Web of
Things standard.6 We implemented clients as JavaScript web
applications using web3.js Ethereum JavaScript API7 and the
Metamask Firefox extension.8.
The invocation of an Ethereum smart contract function
creates some computational overhead measured in “gas” units:
the amount of gas “consumed” by a function depends on
the operation’s complexity. Each user declares the price he
5https://iot.mozilla.org/
6https://www.w3.org/WoT/
7https://web3js.readthedocs.io
8https://metamask.io/
is willing to pay per gas unit: the bigger the amount, the
faster the operation will be executed. The fastest an operation
can be executed is ∼14sec. which is the time required by
the Ethereum network to generate a new block. Hence, users
compete each other since they wish to execute their operation
fast but they do not want to get charged a lot. Currently,
the average price of a unit of gas is9 $0.004 × 10−4. Our
construction uses Ethereum’s events and it is built using
a “mapping” type, i.e., a hashtable-like data structure that
maps “keys” to “values”. Our events have two fields, namely
OPCode of type byte and URIResource of type bytes32 (i.e.,
a byte array of size 32). Furthermore, our mapping maps keys
of type address to values of type int and it is used for maintain
client’s balance. The primitive operations required by our
smart contract are map search, creation of a new map entry,
and modification of the value of a map entry. Table 1 shows
the cost of these operations in terms of gas consumption. In
addition to these costs, each transaction has an overhead of
21000 gas.
Operation Cost measured in gas
Send Operation event 2560
Search map 1033
Map entry creation 45938
Map entry modification 6110
TABLE I
COST OF OUR CONSTRUCTION BUILDING BLOCKS
B. Qualitative and security properties
Our construction leverages the inherent properties of the
blockchain technology. By design, blockchain solutions offer
reliability and robustness, since the “ledger” is replicated in
multiple locations and there is no single point of failure.
Furthermore, blockchain communication protocols and APIs
include message integrity protection, as well as resilience
against replay attacks. Smart contract execution is determin-
istic and cannot be affected by malicious entities. Similarly,
smart contracts cannot be modified, not even by their owners.
As already discussed, invoking a smart contract function has
some monetary cost; this could be an effective defense against
Denial of Service attacks.
As far as our token-based access control is concerned, it can
be observed that it has some intriguing security properties.
Firstly, tokens can only be used by their owners, and token
owners cannot transfer them to other users. Even if the
blockchain keys of a user are compromised, our construction
prevents token transfer (of course the stolen keys can be used
for issuing transactions on behalf of the victim users). This
is a significant advantage compared to traditional token-based
access control mechanisms where, not only the corresponding
tokens have to be secured, but also a token recipient should be
able to verify the binding between the token and the user who
sent it (i.e., additional mechanisms for detecting stolen tokens
should be in place). In other words, the responsibility (and
security) of binding of tokens to token owners is performed
9As measured by https://ethgasstation.info on 20 Mar. 2019
by the blockchain and it is not the responsibility of each user
(which opens security issues). Furthermore, and as already
discussed, blockchains are an indelible, append-only, and
tamper-proof logs, hence, in case of a security incident or
in case of a dispute they can provide undeniable auditing
information. Moreover, our construction offers secure and
effective revocation. Ethereum’s mechanisms guarantee that
only an owner can revoke tokens (providing of course that
the owner’s private key is secured), as well as, that a token
revocation has immediate affect. Finally, since our construction
is based on an established Ethereum standard, libraries and
wallets that support it, can be used for implementing client
applications.
Ethereum is composed of a P2P network where all valid
blocks are broadcast to all nodes. In reality, events are special
fields encoded in those blocks, hence the number of nodes
watching for events does not have any impact on the number
of transmitted messages. In other words, if we take Ethereum
infrastructure for granted (or any other similar architecture) it
is costless to build a group communication application on top
of that. Moreover, due to this property, the network location
of the IoT gateways does not have to be well known, neither
have gateways to be reachable through the Internet.
C. Discussion
Despite the advantages of the blockchain technology, it
comes with some costs. As already discussed Ethereum (and
most blockchain systems) involve some monetary cost, as well
as some transaction delay. Unfortunately, and since Ethereum
is still an experimental technology, the monetary cost of trans-
actions fluctuates greatly. Furthermore, Ethereum operates on
the premise that at least half of the network nodes are honest;
having an attacker controlling more than 50% of the nodes
in an unlikely but not impossible threat. Finally, Ethereum’s
ledger is public and anybody can inspect it. This property
constitutes a privacy threat since it is possible for a thrid party
to deduce information such as, who perform which operation
and when, the “roles” of the users, the introduction of new
authorized users, etc. All these shortcomings can possibly be
addressed using a “permissioned” private blockchain, such as
Hyperledger Fabric.10
In the construction presented in this paper clients interact
with the IoT devices only through the blockchain. Of course
cases where a client interacts directly with an IoT gateway can
be considered. This direct interaction has some advantages,
including zero transaction fees and faster response times.
Moreover, and since the Ethereum ledger is replicated in all
nodes, a gateway can still perform token-based access control.
On the other hand, in this case, the gateway should be able
to verify the identity of the client (i.e., his blockchain public
key).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we designed, developed, and evaluated an IoT
access architecture based on smart contracts and blockchains.
10https://www.hyperledger.org/projects/fabric
Our solution leverages the distributed nature of the blockchain
technology to build an event-based system for managing IoT
devices connected to Web of Things gateways. Furthermore,
we enhanced our architecture with an access control solution
based on custom blockchain tokens. Our access control so-
lution has some intriguing properties and presents some im-
portant advantages compared to traditional token-based access
control systems. Finally, our Ethereum-based implementation
shows that our solution is feasible and with low overhead.
Blockchain and smart contracts are an exiting, evolving
technology, with endless possibilities. Hence, our system can
be extended in numerous ways. For instance, our system can
be extended to support an IoT-based sharing economy, or
even auctions over IoT access tokens (e.g., a frivolous but
prosperous use case could be an auction for the token that can
light the Christmas tree of a city). Similarly, the blockchain
can be used for tracking user reputation or even “score” in
a gameficated application. Finally, our architecture can be
extended to support blockchain-based decentralized identifiers,
a new technology under standardization with exciting security
and privacy properties.
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